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Can Soft Words Lead to Strong Deeds?
A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Human
Rights Commitments’ Enforcement
Adeline Michoud*
With the rise of globalization, corporations have imposed themselves as
powerful actors in the international arena. Their production methods, notably
their outsourcing in developing countries where few labor or environmental
standards are applicable, are sometimes criticized for the risks they pose to
local workers, and society as a whole. Many corporations are eager to protect
their reputation and are starting to grasp the importance of complying with
minimum human rights and environmental norms. 1
The empowerment of corporations has led to the notion of corporate social
responsibility (CSR), where corporations consider the problems that may be
attributed to their activities.2 CSR is composed of a combination of national
laws and regulations imposed on corporations by states with regard to
environmental protection or workers’ health and safety, together with codes

*

LL.M, Teaching & Research Assistant at the University of Geneva, Ph.D candidate,
Trainee Lawyer.
1
Peter Forstmoser, Corporate Responsibility und Reputation—zwei Schlüsselbegriffe an
der Schnittstelle von Recht, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft [Corporate Responsibility and
Reputation – Two Key Terms at the Interface of Law, Economy and Society], in,
UNTERNEHMEN—TRANSAKTION—RECHT, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ROLF WATTER [Company Trasnaction – Law: Liber Amicorum for Wolf Watter’s 50th birthday] 204 (Nedim Peter
Vogt et. al. eds., Dike Verlag, 2008); Klaus Leisinger, Menschenrechte als
unternehmerische Verantwortungsdimension, in GESELLSCHAFTLICHE VERANTWORTUNG VON UNTERNEHMEN – VON DER IDEE DER CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY ZUR ERFORLGREICHEN UMSETZUNG 127 (Arnd Hardtke & Annette
Kleinfeld eds.,Gabler Verlag, 2010).
2
MICHAEL KERR ET. AL., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 51
(LexisNexis Canada, 2009), https://store.lexisnexis.ca/en/categories/products/ corporatesocial-responsibility-a-legal-analysis-skusku-cad-00708/details [https://perma.cc/9H8QXBDV].
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of conduct and other voluntary instruments adopted by companies. 3 CSR
aims at

making corporations integrate

considerations in their practice.

social

and environmental

4

The question of corporate social responsibility started to emerge in the late
1970s,5 focusing on the legal obligations of enterprises rather than simply on
their moral considerations. Its aim is to prevent harm from occurring and
provide remedies to victims. The notion was first considered a soft law
concept, as corporations were encouraged to auto-regulate their business
conduct and voluntarily integrate social and environmental norms. 6
Corporations have a strong interest in showing a willingness to comply with
these standards. Indeed, a company’s reputation on the market is one of its
most valuable assets.7 Therefore, CSR represents an effective marketing
policy for corporations, as this allows them to gain respectability and
credibility among customers and investors.8 In fact, most of the world’s
biggest companies now integrate non-financial data in their annual reports.9
3

JENNIFER ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (Cambridge University
Press, 2006).
4
See generally Archie B. Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a
Definitional Construct, 38 (3) BUS. & SOC. 268, 268-95 (1999).
5
See generally Gayle C. Avery & Harald Bergsteiner, A Theoretical Responsibility and
Accountability Framework for CSR and Global Responsibility, 1(1) J. OF GLOBAL
RESPONSIBILITY 8, 8Ä33 (2010).
6
See Edouard Dubois & Jérôme Chacornac, Les limites de l’autorégulation en droit des
sociétés, Bull. Joly Sociétés 2013, pp. 758ss.
7
AMIS BREW L.P. & CAROLINE ERSMARKER, Human Rights: It Is Your Business—The
Case for Corporate Engagement, The Prince of Wales International Business Leader
Forum, 2005, p.4.
8
ROMAN BRETSCHGER, UNTERNEHMEN UND MENSCHENRECHTE—ELEMENTE UND
POTENZIAL EINES INFORMELLEN MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZES [Business and Human
Rights – Elements and Potential of Informal Human Rights Protections], Schweizer
Studien zum Internationalen Recht Band 55 (Schulthess, 2010); Hans Caspar Von Der
Crone, Verantwortlichkeit, Anreize und Reputation in der Corporate Governance der
Publikumsgesellschaft, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT 239, 271 (2000);
ROBERT REICH,
SUPERCAPITALISM—THE TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS,
DEMOCRACY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 178 (Vintage Books, 2007).
9
See KPMG, The Road Ahead: The KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility
Reporting, 2017, https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/campaigns/csr/pdf/CSR_
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Yet, this voluntary character of corporate social responsibility also
represents one of its main weaknesses, as no real compliance mechanisms
have been set up to ensure the enforcement of the commitments taken by
multinational firms. The lack of enforcement mechanisms, which comprises
risks of non-compliance, has led to the consideration of imposing binding
obligations on corporations, the culmination of which is illustrated by the
current discussions on a binding treaty for corporations in international law10
taking place at the United Nations.
Nowadays, references to CSR tend to insist more on the responsibility that
private entities have towards society as a whole: “each business enterprise,
as a member of society, has a responsibility to operate ethically and in
accordance with its legal obligations and to strive to minimize any adverse
effects of its operations and activities on the environment, society and human
health.”11 Nevertheless, assessing a responsibility can only be efficient if
adequate remedies are provided to enforce this responsibility.
An innovative approach that has progressively emerged as a means of
imposing certain obligations on companies is the notion of corporate codes,
whose content many claim is binding.12 Corporate codes of conduct are
policy statements that outline the ethical standards of conduct a corporation
adheres to. Corporate codes may take the form of a general policy statement
or be inserted in the corporation’s contracts with suppliers, in the sense that
Reporting_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/AGX7-UFC9] (non-financial reporting includes
information on environmental protection measures implemented by the companies, social
responsibility and treatment of employees, respect for human rights but also measures to
fight against corruption and bribery).
10
OPEN-ENDED INTERGOVERNMENTAL WORKING GROUP ON TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES RITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS,
LEGALLY BINDING INSTRUMENTS TO REGULATE, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW, THE ACTIVITIES OF TRANSATIONAL CORPORTATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES (July 16, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/
WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf [https://perma.cc/YTW5-Q63T].
11
Zerk, supra note 3, at 32.
12
See Carola Glinski, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Moral or Legal Obligation?, in
DOREEN MCBARNET ET AL., THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 119–47 (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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they must agree to abide by the company’s ethical standards. Codes of
conduct do not have the status of legal norms.13 They are self-regulatory
systems that govern business practices and are valid by virtue of agreement.
However, one can legitimately wonder if a novel duty of care can be created
through the emergence of codes of conduct. This article shall notably study the
case law that was developed in the United States14 and in Spain15 in that
regard.
The regulation of corporations has primarily been introduced via the
establishment of reporting duties which aim to impose on companies a duty
to monitor their activities and those of their supply chains.16 Such an
approach was already called for in the Guidelines on Multinational
Enterprises drafted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), 17 as well as by the European Commission in its 2014
proposal for a regulation on the acquisition of minerals from conflict areas.
The European Commission defines due diligence in the supply chain as
measures such as “risk management, third-party audits and disclosure of
information with a view to identifying and addressing actual and potential
risks… to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts associated with their…
activities.”18 This article, therefore, assesses the efficiency of the reporting
duties established in both common law and civil law countries.
13

Ada-Iuliana Popescu, In Brief: Pros and Cons of Corporate Codes of Conduct, 9 J. OF
PUB. ADMIN., FIN. AND L.125, 128 (2016).
14 Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009).
15
S.T.S., [Supreme Court of Spain] Mar. 7, 2007, No. 132/2005 (Sp.).
16
Justine Nolan, Enhancing Corporate Accountability: Prospects and Challenges
Conference Proceedings 8-9 Feb. 2006 181–210. (also available at: https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=975414 [https://perma.cc/WD9F-WYUA]).
17
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QW7V-T799].
18
REPORT ON THE PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
OF THE COUNCIL SETTING U P A UNION SYSTEM FOR SUPPLY CHAIN DUE DILIGENCE
SELF-CERTIFICATION OF RESPONSIBLE IMPORTERS OF TIN, TANTALUM AND TUNGSTEN,
THEIR ORES, AND GOLD ORIGINATING IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS,
COM (2014) 0111 (Apr. 24, 2015).
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As we shall develop throughout this article, the commitments made by
companies, both in their corporate codes of conduct or as part of their
reporting duties, should be accompanied by sanctions in case of noncompliance. Sole reliance on corporations’ goodwill and assertions are not
sufficient to secure a thorough implementation of social and environmental
standards. This article seeks to analyze and compare the enforcement of
corporations’ CSR policies in Western countries, both in the United States
and in European countries. First, we shall conduct a comparative analysis
between different Western countries as to the enforceability of corporate
codes of conduct before national tribunals. Then, we shall assess the reporting
duties imposed by the law in several Western countries and determine what
method shall better encourage companies to comply with corporate social
responsibility standards.

I. THE UNCERTAIN ENFORCEABILITY OF CORPORATE CODES OF
CONDUCT
Corporate codes of conduct can be defined as “guidelines that intend to
describe companies’ responsibilities in the areas of human rights, labor, the
environment, and socially sensitive business in general.”19 The codes codify
the fundamental values and norms that govern the conduct of directors,
employees, and suppliers. Corporate codes of conduct can take the form
of a general policy statement or be inserted in the corporation’s contracts
with suppliers. However, codes of conduct do not have the status of legal
norms. They are self-regulatory systems that govern business practices and
are valid by virtue of agreement. Corporate codes of conduct have gained the

19

Jan Smits, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes Under Private Law: On The
Disciplining Power of Legal Doctrine, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 99, 101-02 (2017);
See also RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 58 (Stephen
Tully, eds., Edward Elgar, 2005).
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role of voluntary tools that enable companies to comply with their corporate
responsibilities.20
Codes of conduct have been issued both at the international and national
levels. At the international level, we can notably quote the OECD Guidelines
and the Ruggie Principles. Some states have also elaborated draft codes of
conduct, such as the 2014 British Ethical Trading Initiative Base Code,21 the
2008 Dutch Corporate Governance Code,22 and the 2011 German
Sustainability Code.23 Corporations can choose to adopt these draft codes, or
they can elaborate their own guidelines, as some major transnational
corporations (TNCs) have done, like Coca Cola’s Code of Business Conduct
or Primark’s Code of Conduct.24 Over the past few years, corporations are
20

See Alexander Dahlsrud, How Corporate Social Responsibility Is Defined: An Analysis
of 37 Definitions, 15CORPORATE SOC. RESPONSIBILITY AND ENV’T MGMT. 1, 4Ä11 (2008)
(in an analysis of 37 different CSR definitions, Alexander Dahlsrud found that one of the
common features of the notion of corporate social responsibility was its claimed voluntary
nature.); Olivier De Schutter, Corporate Social Responsibility European Style, 14 EUR.
L. J. 203, 203Ä36 (2008) (a critique of the voluntary nature of CSR); Jan Eijsbouts,
Extraordinary Professor Corporate Social Responsibility at the Faculty of Law, Inaugeral
Lecture at Maastricht University: Inaugural Lecture: Corporate Responsibility, Beyond
Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the License to Operate (Oct. 20, 2011).
(Transcript available at http://www.l4bb.org/ articles/OBS_7885_-_Eijsbouts_digitale1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQM3-BGCK]).
21
Ethical Trading Intiative, THE ETHICAL TRADING INITATIVE BASE CODE,
https://www.ethicaltrade.org/sites/default/files/shared_resources/ETI%20Base%20Code
%20%28English%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JSU-2B75] (last visted Nov. 09, 2017, 04:45
PM).
22 Dutch Corporate Governance Code: Principles of Good Corporate Governance and
Best Practices Provisions (2008), https://www.mccg.nl/download/?id=609 [https://
perma.cc/3HXL-GGFD].
23
Rat für Nachhaltige Entwicklung (Council for sustainable development), the German
Sustainability Code (GSC) : Recommendations of the German Council for Sustainable
Development (2012) (the German has been updated in 2017. Its fourth edition is available
here:
https://www.nachhaltigkeitsrat.de/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/The_
SustainabilityCode_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM65-U2PP]).
24
THE COCA-COLA CO., CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT: ACTING WITH INTEGRITY
AROUND
THE
GLOBE
(2008),
http://assets.cocacolacompany.com/45/34/
04efe22946d7903f05ec108d95e5/COBC_France_English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JHTVNZE]; Primark Supplier Code of Conduct (2016), https://www.primark.com/en/ourethics/workplace-rights/code-of-conduct [https://perma.cc/7V6C-EXWK].
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increasingly adopting corporate codes of conduct. In fact, “[m]ost, if not all,
leading companies now have strategies relating to CSR.”25
Originally, corporate codes were voluntary in the sense that corporations
were free, from a legal point of view, to decide whether or not to adopt a code
of conduct and to determine its content. However, an increasing number of
hard law prescriptive provisions have progressively required the adoption of
corporate codes. We can notably quote the U.S. Congressional Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (FSG) of 1991. The FSG were
aimed to be adopted by all U.S. and non-U.S. multinational companies to
respect American rules relating to anti-trust.26 Moreover, in the past,
corporations benefited from a certain flexibility to draft their codes of
conduct; this flexibility is now restricted, notably by societal expectations in
terms of management of adverse impacts of business activities.27
However, even though corporate codes of conduct are supposed to relate
to international standards, they lack an international mechanism to hold
violators liable.28 Therefore, claimants need to turn to domestic remedies to
enforce the codes.29 In consequence, this makes the success of the claim
dependent on different national substantive laws which may differ in terms
of conditions of responsibility or damages awarded. Different jurisdictions
have reached different results as to the direct applicability of corporate codes
of conduct.

25

Zerk, supra note 3, at 7.
See 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2 (2016) (prohibited Foreign Trade Practices by Domestic
Concerns of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977).
27
Jan Eijsbouts, Corporate Codes as Private Co-Regulatory Instruments in Corporate
Governance and Responsibility and Their Enforcement, 2 4 ( 1 ) IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 181, 205 ( 2017).
28
Yousef Farah, Improving Accountability through the Contractualisation of Human
Rights, 2 BUS. AND HUM. RTS. REV. 11, 13 (2013).
29
See, e.g., Ruggie, J., Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of
Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts (2007), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/108/85/PDF/G0710885.pdf?OpenElement (last visited
May 30, 2019, 6:19 PM).
26
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The question of the binding character of corporate codes of conduct was
notably raised in the United States in the Doe v. Walmart case.30 In this
case, Chinese, Bengali, Indonesian, and Nicaraguan workers alleged before
the Los Angeles courts that Walmart (a multinational supermarket chain) had
not respected its code of conduct contracted with its workers and
subcontractors. This code of conduct required foreign suppliers to respect a
certain amount of commitments relating to safety at work, minimum wage,
and discrimination.31 The workers claimed that Walmart did not adequately
monitor its suppliers and that the short deadlines and low prices it imposed
in its supply contracts forced suppliers to violate the labor standards.32 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the supply contracts did not aim to
protect the workers, and that no duty could be held to stem from the code of
conduct.33 The court instead considered that Walmart had reserved itself in
this code of conduct the right to inspect the suppliers, but that this did not
amount to a duty to inspect them.34
Similarly, in France, in a decision called Association France-Palestine
Solidarité ‘AFPS’ v. Société Alstom Transport SA,35 the Versailles Court of
Appeal held that the failure to abide to a company’s code of ethics was not a
breach of international law (in this case, the defendant company had adhered
to the Global Compact’s rules).36 The Court considered that the code of ethics
and the Global Compact did not create any obligations or commitments
towards third parties who may wish to see them observed.
30

Walmart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d at 682 (“Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to support
the conclusion that Wal-Mart and the suppliers intended for Plaintiffs to have a right of
performance against Wal-Mart under the supply contract”).
31
Id. at 679Ä80.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 682.
34
Id.
35
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, civ., 59A, Mar. 20, 2013,
11/05331 (Fr.).
36
See Alstom, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-isgc/participants/523-Alstom [https://perma.cc/99FF-M5HB] (Alstom is included as a
participant in the UN Global Compact).
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Moreover, in a similar French case, SHERPA introduced an action against
Samsung an electronic device company, claiming that it violated its
commitments as expressed in its code of conduct entitled “Global Harmony
with People, Society and the Environment.” In fact, the French association
accused Samsung of violating its workers’ labor rights, exposing them to
deplorable working conditions, and requiring workers to “work up to eleven
hours a day, without overtime compensation and without any social
insurance.”37 The case was rejected by the court, which chose not to follow
up on the claim.38
However, the binding nature of corporate codes of conduct is occasionally
recognized. In the United States, the University of Wisconsin presented a
claim for breach of contract against its contracting partner, Adidas, for not
complying with the anti-sweatshop provisions of the contract, as evidence
had been brought regarding abusive labor conditions in the brand’s supply
chain factories in Indonesia.39 This claim was finally settled out of court
where Adidas agreed to pay compensation to the supply chain workers in

37

See Pierre Barbin, Une ONG Française Dénonce les Conditions de Travail chez
Samsung, LE FIGARO (Dec. 18, 2015) http://www.lefigaro.fr/societes/2015/12/17/2000520151217ARTFIG00139-une-ong-francaise-denonce-les-conditions-de-travail-chezsamsung.php [https://perma.cc/X5G5-5CAN].
38
See also Sherpa, Classement sans suite des plaintes contre Samsung et Auchan : la loi
sur le devoir de vigilance des multinationales doit être adoptée sans attendre, (Jan. 21,
2015), https://www.asso-sherpa.org/classement-sans-suite-des-plaintes-contre-samsunget-auchan-la-loi-sur-le-devoir-de-vigilance-des-multinationales-doit-etre-adoptee-sansattendre#.VL_f5UeG91Y [https://perma.cc/44NG-TPHT] (ranking without follow-up of
the complaints against Samsung and Auchan: the law on the duty of vigilance of the
multinationals must be adopted without waiting. However, the SHERPA Association has
chosen to present another civil claim against Samsung for deceptive marketing practices in
June 2018, available at: https://www.asso-sherpa.org/samsung-sherpa-actionaid-francedeposent-plainte-constitution-de-partie-civile-contre-leader-mondial-smartphone
[https://perma.cc/M6WL-XN6Z]).
39
PR Watch, Univ. of WI Launches Historic Challenge to Adidas over Sweatshop
Conditions for College-Branded Apparel, THE CENTER FOR MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY
(July 14, 2012), https://www.prwatch.org/news/2012/07/11641/university-wisconsinlaunches-historic-challenge-adidas-over-sweatshop-conditions [https://perma.cc/ED53SRLL].
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Indonesia.40 The fact that Adidas finally opted for an out-of-court settlement
indicates that it felt compelled by its code of conduct and that the claimants
had a strong case.
In Spain, the Supreme Court considered that a code of conduct signed
between a firm and workers’ unions must be respected, and that it may
generate disciplinary sanctions in case of non-compliance.41 In France, the
Cassation Court has also conceded that the declaration of CEOs could be
considered a unilateral commitment, but no indication as to the available
remedies in case of a breach was provided.42 Finally, the Criminal Chamber of
the French Court of Cassation adopted a very interesting position in the
Erika43 case by using the codes of conduct adopted on a voluntary basis by
Total, the defendant company, to serve as a basis for its criminal liability.
Some authors consider that corporate codes of conduct are voluntary
instruments which should be interpreted as unilateral commitments “that
indicate a corporation’s willingness to take on a global regulatory role in the
absence of a global political government—a phenomenon that is difficult to
grasp from the perspective of traditional private law categories.”44 If these
commitments are considered unilateral, they become more difficult to
enforce, as private law focuses on the enforcement of reciprocal
obligations.45
Under the doctrine of the privity of contract, which is recognized in most
jurisdictions, any party that is not part of a contract or of an agreement cannot
40

Bus. and Hum. Rts. Resource Centre, Adidas Lawsuit (re Univ. of WI), BUS. AND HUM.
RTS. RESOURCE CENTRE (Jan. 1, 2001), https://www.business-humanrights.org/ en/adidaslawsuit-re-university-of-wisconsin#c18941 [https://perma.cc/GS5H-3UB8].
41
S.T.S., supra note 15.
42 Cour de Cassation, Chambre Sociale, 25 Nov. 2003, no. 01-17501.
43
Cour de Cassation[Cass.], Chambre criminelle, Sept. 25, 2012, Bull. Crim., No. 1082.938.
44
See Gunther Teubner & Anna Beckers, Expanding Constitutionalism, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 523, 533Ä36 (2013).
45
Anna Beckers, Legislation Under the Premises of Globalization: Why and Where to
Enforce Corporate Social Responsibility Codes, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 15, 15
(2017).

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Can Soft Words Lead to Strong Deeds?

enjoy the benefits of the contract, nor can this third party seek to enforce it.46
However, a doctrine has developed in recent years known as the “Third-Party
Beneficiary Rule.” Under this doctrine, a third party, who is not a party to a
contract, can seek to enforce a promise made for his or her benefit under the
contract, although this third person was not a party to the contract, 47 at the
condition that it was the parties’ intention at the time of the contract.48
However, this doctrine presents a problem; it leaves the possibility for
companies to invoke that they do not wish to allow third parties to enforce
the promises that it made in corporate codes.
This raises the question as to which beneficiaries can rely on the rules stated
in the corporate codes of conduct.49 Common law has developed the notion
of “intended beneficiaries,” which designates all persons to whom a right is
intended to be conferred in a contract.50 This rule has even been statutorily
fixed in the United Kingdom under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties)

46

Jesse Warren Lilienthal, Privity of Contract, 1 HARV. L. REV. 226, 226 (1887).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (published in 1981 by the American
Law Institute provides that « parties to a contract have the power if they so intend to create
a right in a third party »); See also Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A
Study on the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1111Ä12 (1985)
(explaining that the possibility for a third party to enforce a contract is well accepted in the
United States).
48
Oyeniyi Abe, Untying the Gordian Knot: Re-Assessing the Impact of Business and
Human Rights Principles on Extractive Resource Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 32
AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 895, 920 (2017).
49
See ANNA BECKERS, ENFORCING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY CODES: ON
GLOBAL SELF-REGULATION AND NATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 81 (Hart Publishing, 2015);
ANDREAS RÜHMKORF, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRIVATE LAW AND
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 196 (Elgar, 2015).
50
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (INTENDED AND INCIDENTAL
BENEFICIARIES, 2012) (replaced two terms previously used in § 133 of Restatement (First)
of Contracts: “creditor beneficiary” and “donee beneficiary.” Notably, the Second
Restatement does not restrict the definition of “intended beneficiary” to only the creditor
or donee beneficiary scenarios. The Second Restatement broadened the term to
recognize situations in which the “purpose of the promise” was not “to make a gift” but
also to confer a right).
47

VOLUME 18 • ISSUE 2 • 2020

587

588 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Act o f 1999. Under this act, a third party can enforce rights under a contract
if it “purports to confer a benefit” on the third party.51
Some authors have argued in favor of the application of this rule for
corporate codes of conduct so that third-party beneficiaries of the corporate
codes can enforce them.52 Therefore, environmental and social commitments
taken by a company in its corporate code of conduct could be interpreted
as intending to confer third-party rights to claimants who could be
affected by co r p o r ate breaches and could thus invoke these commitments
to obtain reparation.
Moreover, in the United States, the Second Restatement of Contracts
recognizes that a third party can reasonably seek enforcement of a promise
made. The condition is that the reliance on the promise is both “reasonable
and probable.”53 For example, in the case Chen v. Street Beat Sportswear
Inc.,54 workers sued a domestic clothing manufacturer alleging third-party
beneficiary status on the basis of an agreement between the defendant and the
United States Department of Labor. The workers required the manufacturer
to comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act.55 The court held that the
corporation was indeed liable towards the workers of the supply chain on
the basis of the agreement it had concluded.56
51

Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act of 1999 §§ 1(a) & (b) (allowing a third party to
a contract to enforce rights under the contract if (a) the contract expressly provides that he
may or (b) the term purports to confer a benefit on him, as the parties intended the term to
be enforceable by the third party. Under this Act, the third party must be expressly
identified in the contract by name, as a member of a class, or by particular description).
52
John N. Adams et al., Privity of Contracts - The Benefits and the Burdens of Law
Reform, 60 MOD. L. REV. 238, 242 (1997); ANDREAS RÜHMKORF, CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY, PRIVATE LAW AND GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 211 (Elgar, 2015) (both
defend the idea that third parties should be able to enforce the rights that parties to contracts
intended to grant them. This better ensures the performance of the contract).
53
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302.
54
Chen v. Street Beat Sportswear, Inc., 226 F. Supp.2d 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); see also,
Katherine Kenny, Code or Conduct: Whether Wal-Mart’s Code of Conduct Creates a
Contractual Obligation Between Wal-Mart and the Employees of its Foreign Suppliers, 27
NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 453, 463Ä67 (2007).
55
Id. at 356–57.
56
Id. at 366.
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Therefore, if an enterprise adopts corporate social commitments without
expressly rejecting any third-party enforcement rights, affected victims of
corporate wrong may be considered to have third-party beneficiary rights.
The doctrine has identified several factors to assess whether a promise is
binding or not and whether it can be invoked by a third party,57 notably
the proximity between the promisor and the third party, the fact that the
third party could reasonably understand the declaration as an intention to
be legally bound, and the intention of the promisor to be bound.58 This
approach has also been used to determine whether a corporate code of
conduct can have a binding effect, as in Doe v. Walmart, where the court
analyzed the proximity between the suppliers’ employees and Walmart.59
It has been claimed that when two companies agree to comply with a CSR
code, there is a presumption that they have an intention to be legally bound
by this code.60 The challenging situation is when the claimants have not
entered into any contract with the company that promised to abide to a certain
code of conduct. As illustrated in the case Doe v. Walmart Stores, an
employee of a supply chain cannot bring an action against the co-contractor
of its employer.61 However, if the claimants and the co-contractor of the
employer are considered part of a chain of contracts, who share profits

57

PATRICK ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 40Ä72 (Clarendon Paperbacks, 1986)
(discussing the moral and legal approach to hold a promise as binding); see generally
JAN SMITS, CONTRACT LAW: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION (Elgar, 2014).
58
See Principles of European Contract Law ch. 2, § 1, art. 2:101, European Union 1998
(“A contract is concluded if the parties intend to be legally bound, and they reach a
sufficient agreement without any further requirement.”); see also Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 2(1) (American Law Institute 1981 (“A promise is a manifestation of intention
to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in
understanding that a commitment has been made”).
59 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 572 F.3d at 680.
60
See Jan Smits, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes Under Private Law:
On the Disciplining Power of Legal Doctrine, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 99, 99Ä113
(2017).
61 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 572 F.3d at 681.
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and liabilities and operate in a coordinated way for a same specific goal, then
the claimants could enforce the rules of the corporate code of conduct.62
One can wonder if the corporate code reflects an intention to be legally
bound by the company towards its customers, or if it does not simply
constitute an ethical commitment to produce some efforts.63 Yet, the
protection of consumers’ legitimate interests could be a fair argument to
enforce corporate codes of conduct.64 According to Article 2(2) let.d of the
European Consumer Sales Directive, it is now possible to enforce public
declarations that traders use in marketing.65 The Vienna Sales Convention
(CISG) discussed the question of the introduction of the enforcement of
unilateral promises, notably related to Article 8 and Article 9 CISG. In the
United States, the discussion has also started regarding Section 90 of The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts to determine whether corporate
promises could be enforced to protect workers abroad.66
62

Marie-Caroline Caillet, Le droit à l’épreuve de la responsabilité sociétale des
entreprises : étude à partir des entreprises transnationales, 263Ä67 (Mar. 7, 2015) (Fr.),
https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01127610/document [https://perma.cc/W6X4-RAVD].
63 See Jan Eijsbouts, Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options
to
Reinforce
the
Licence
to
Operate,
MAASTRICHT
U.
(2011),
http://www.l4bb.org/articles/OBS_7885_-_Eijsbouts_digitale-1.pdf (Nov. 09, 2017,
09:41 AM); see also BECKERS, supra note 48, at 81; ANDREAS RÜHMKORF,
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRIVATE LAW AND GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 175
( Elgar, 2015) (reaching a different result and arguing in favor of legislative intervention
to regulate third-party rights).
64
See John N. Adams et al., Privity of Contracts - The Benefits and the Burdens of Law
Reform, 60 MOD. L. REV. 238, 242 (1997); A NDREAS RÜHMKORF, CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY, PRIVATE LAW AND GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 211 (Elgar, 2015).
65
PARL. EUR. DOC. (SEC 319999L0044) 12Ä16 (1999) (“Consumer goods are presumed
to be in conformity with the contract if they show the quality and performance which are
normal in goods of the same type and which the consumer can reasonably expect, given
the nature of the goods and taking into account any public statements on the specific
characteristics of the goods made about them by the seller, the producer or his
representative, particularly in advertising or on labelling”).
66
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (“A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be
limited as justice requires”).
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However, none of these discussions have amounted to a clear recognition
of the enforceability of corporate codes of conduct’s commitments by third
parties. Yet, international trade law contains principles, such as the
protection of legitimate expectations and venire contra factum proprium,67
which prohibit private actors from issuing declarations that may raise
some expectations, whereas the promisors then adopt a contradictory
behavior.68 Corporate codes should be assimilated to such promises.69
One suggestion to avoid these problems of enforcement is to integrate
codes of conduct into contracts. The underlying idea is that this integration
of corporate codes should confer them a certain binding character by joining
them to the main contract. For Jan Smith, enforcement of corporate codes is
only possible when the codes are incorporated into bilateral contracts,
whereas the codes are not enforceable when victims try to seek the
enforcement of a unilateral promise.70 Jane Smith’s underlying idea is that if
unilateral promises were to be enforced, this would go against the basic
principles of legal systems and lead, as Niklas Luhmann has qualified it, to
the decline of the relevance of the legal system, as the elaboration of selfmade rules will be considered enforceable.71 However, we can counter-argue
that corporate codes of conduct then have no purpose and no “raison d’être”
if they are just tiger papers which have no practical effect and do not
contribute to the improvement of the companies’ human rights’ compliance.

67

No one may set himself in contradiction to his own previous conduct.
See Fabrizio Marrella, Human Rights, Arbitration, and Corporate Social Responsibility
in the Law of International Trade, in ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
EIUC STUDIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION 266, 302 (Wolfgang
Benedek et al. eds., 2007).
69 See BECKERS,
supra note 49, at 266Ä69; Gunther Teubner, Corporate Codes in the
Varieties of Capitalism: How Their Enforcement Depends Upon the Difference Between
Production Regimes, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 81, 81 (2017).
70
Smits, supra note 60, at 99Ä113.
71
Niklas Luhmann, Law As A Social System, 490 OXFORD U. PRESS (2008).
68
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Furthermore, some authors argue that corporate codes of conduct do not
need to be integrated into contracts to be enforced.72 Anna Beckers notably
sees the enforcement of codes of conduct as the flexibility of the law to
adapt to new social phenomena.73 She explains that corporate codes of
conduct reflect an emerging system of non-state law which should be
regarded as binding.74
The enforceability of corporate codes of conduct is not systematic. As long
as these commitments are not enforceable, they shall remain empty shells.
Therefore, it appears necessary for codes of conduct to be recognized as
binding on the companies that claim to adopt them. Otherwise, the adoption
of such codes amounts to vain promises. As we shall see in our second
section, states have progressively started to impose reporting duties on
companies as to their level of compliance with corporate social responsibility
standards. Hence, the article shall analyze the relevance of these reporting
duties in the improvement of corporate practices.

II. THE PROGRESSIVE EMERGENCE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING DUTIES
Several transparency initiatives and laws emerged in recent years,
seeking to ensure that companies communicate their production methods in
their supply chains. These initiatives appeared in many Western
jurisdictions, both of common law and civil law traditions. However,
reporting duties generally concern a limited sector of the industry to prevent
only certain types of abuses. Moreover, most of these mandatory disclosure

See generally Pierre Thielbörger & Tobias Ackermann, A Treaty on Enforcing Human
Rights Against Business: Closing the Loophole or Getting Stuck in a Loop? 24 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 43, 43Ä79 (2017).
73 Beckers, supra note 45 at 15Ä42.
74
Id. at 26–27; See generally Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalising TNCs? On the
Linkage of “Private” and “Public” Corporate Codes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 617, 617Ä38 (2011).
72
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laws do not create a real due diligence duty for companies, nor do they
provide any legal sanctions in case of non-compliance.
Reporting duties are imposed on lead firms in a supply chain because these
firms are deemed to exercise considerable power in the global chain.75
Indeed, “it is the firm at the top of the chain that makes the decision to
structure its enterprise through subcontracting relationships, presumably
because such a structure allows the firm to increase profits by lowering the
costs and risk of liability that come with being a direct employer.”76
Therefore, lead firms can influence suppliers down the chain to act in
responsibly.
This segment of the article will explore the different reporting
requirements that were recently developed in both common law and civil law
countries.
A. Common Law Countries
1. The United States
Legislation in the United States is generally adopted to respond to a specific
need for regulation of a narrow area of the law, often in response to a public
demand concerning a specific problem, as notably illustrated by the DoddFrank Act.77 Under this act adopted in 2010, the United States became the first
country to require reporting duties from extractive companies.78
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed
Section 1502 of the United States Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and

75

Galit Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L L. J. 419, 432
(2015).
76
Jennifer Gordon, Joint Liability Approaches to Regulating Recruitment, FORDHAM L.
LEGAL STUDIES, Research Paper No. 2518519 2 (2014).
77
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (codified as
amended at 111 U.S.C. (2010)).
78
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Dodd-Frank 1502 and the Congo Crisis, CTR. STRATEGIC &
INT’L STUDIES (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/dodd-frank-1502-andcongo-crisis [https://perma.cc/QQ45-QRFJ].
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Consumer Protection Act79 in August 2012.80 It requires companies to
disclose annually whether certain minerals (gold, tin, tungsten, and tantalum)
are sourced from the Democratic Republic of Congo or neighboring
countries.81 The aim is to determine whether mineral purchases are used to
fund armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo.82
The act provides indications stating that due diligence measures must
conform to a nationally or internationally recognized due diligence
framework, such as the due diligence guidance approved by the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).83 Therefore, the
Dodd-Frank Act requires companies to conduct mandatory non-financial
reporting in “good faith.”84 Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act also
requires extractive companies to provide reports on the amount of money paid
to each government for the exploitation of resources such as oil, natural gas,
and minerals.85

79

U.S. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (codified as
amended 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2010)); but see Trump Orders Review That Could Relax
Dodd– Frank Bank Rules, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION (Feb. 3, 2017)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-38858009 (explaining United States President
Donald Trump has ordered a review which may result in the repeal of this law).
80
Press Release, U.S. Sec. Exch Comm’n, SEC Adopts Ruling for Disclosing Use of
Conflict Materials (Aug. 22, 2012).
81
See OECD Work on Responsible Mineral Supply Chains and the U.S. Dodd Frank Act,
OECD (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/OECD-Guidance-and-Dodd-FrankAct.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5JT-9683].
82
On the topic, see Galit Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56(2) HARV.
INT’L L.J. 419, 419-63 (2015).
83
See OECD Work on Responsible Mineral Supply Chains and the U.S. Dodd Frank Act,
OECD (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/OECD-Guidance-and-Dodd-FrankAct.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5JT-9683].
84
Securities and Exchange Commission, Fact Sheet: Disclosing the Use of Conflict
Minerals 25, 117 (2012), available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-67716.pdf
[https://perma.cc/95PT-SJBW].
85
Id. at 92.
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Therefore, the law aims to provide transparency to consumers and
investors.86 The law does not provide any sanctions in case of noncompliance, but rather creates a name and shame mechanism, relying on the
idea that the company, to preserve its public image, will be drawn to comply
with the law. Many criticize this lack of enforcement mechanisms.87
Moreover, many have criticized the Dodd-Frank Act for worsening the
situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as it resulted in a “de facto
boycott on minerals from the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.” 88 As
a consequence, thousands of minors were deprived of their livelihood and the
conflicts in Congo continued to thrive, as the Dodd-Frank Act failed “to cut
off resources to war lords or do anything to resolve the reasons for their
violence.”89 Today, the future of the Dodd-Frank Act is quite uncertain.
Indeed, in November 2017, the United States House of Representatives
Financial Services Committee passed a bill, the Financial CHOICE Act, that

86

Christiana Ochoa & Patrick J. Keenan, Regulating Information Flows, Regulating
Conflict: An Analysis of United States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3 GOETTINGEN J.
INT. LAW 129, 147Ä48 (2011).
87
Marcia Narine, From Kansas to the Congo: Why Naming and Shaming Corporations
Through the Dodd-Frank Act’s Corporate Governance Disclosure Won’t Solve a Human
Rights Crisis, 25 U. L. REV. 351, 360 (2013).
88
Dominic Parker, Conflict Minerals or Conflict Policies? New research on the
unintended consequences of conflict-mineral regulation, 37 PERC Reports 36, 36-40
(2018), https://www.perc.org/2018/07/13/conflict-minerals-or-conflict-policies/ [https://
perma.cc/HR68-EJ26].
89
See Nik Stoop, Marijke Verpoorten & Peter van der Windt, Trump threatened to
suspend the ‘conflict minerals’ provision of Dodd-Frank. That might actually be good for
Congo., Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 2018 (Oct. 8, 2018, 5:20 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/27/trump-canceled-the-conflictminerals-provision-of-dodd-frank-thats-probably-good-for-thecongo/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3fd621c89832, [https://perma.cc/PQK8-7HWU]; See
also Nik Stoop et al. More Legislation, More Violence? The Impact of Dodd-Frank in the
DRC, 13 PLOS ONE 1 (2018).
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should repeal Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act.90 The United States
Senate now has to approve the Bill. 91
The United States have adopted other due diligence legislation other than
the Dodd-Frank Act. U.S. lawmakers have notably taken action following an
intensive press coverage over forced labor issues in Asia by adopting the
“Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery (BSCT)
Act of 2015.”92 The BSCT aims to increase supply chain transparency and
gather information on human trafficking.93 Here again, the BSCT requires
companies to file annual reports that the SEC then comments.94 The
requirement is only imposed on companies that have an annual revenue
greater than $100 million United States dollars.95
Criticism can be raised as to the real efficiency of the BSCT. Indeed,
companies can theoretically satisfy the provisions of the BSCT without
undertaking any actual change in their policies, notably, because the wording
of the BSCT is ambiguous, and because there are no real enforcement
mechanisms within the BSCT. Moreover, companies which do not abide to

90

See Arving Ganesan, Business and Human Rights During the Trump Era, 3(02) BUS. &
HUM. RTS. J. 265, 266 (2018).
91
See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, HR 10, 115th Cong. (2017Ä2018), https://
www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/10 [https://perma.cc/MMR4-P9JM].
92 Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2015, HR 3226,
114th Cong. (2015). On the topic, see I a n Urbina, Consumers and Lawmakers Take
Steps to End Forced Labor in Fishing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/09/14/world/consumers-and-lawmakers-take-steps-to-end-forcedlabor-in-fishing.html [https://perma.cc/79YY-MDN2].
93
See Christiana Ochoa & Patrick Keenan, Regulating Information Flows, Regulating
Conflict: An Analysis of United States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3 GOETTINGEN J. IN’L
L. 129, 129Ä54 (2011) (analyzing the strengths and shortcomings of a provision in the
Frank-Dodd Wall Street Reform Act, which addresses conflict minerals originating from
the Democratic Republic of Congo, to regulate conflict commerce as a tool to cease the
violent conflict taking place in the region).
94
HR 3226, supra note 92, §3(s)(1).
95
This threshold is defined in Section 3, Part 3(A) of the Business Supply Chain
Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2015. Id. at §3(3)(A).
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the BSCT rules face few consequences and thus lack an incentive to comply.96
In fact, some corporations might consider that the effort is too costly and
they could thus pretend to agree to respect certain goals without bringing any
changes to their business practices. Therefore, the BSCT does not hold
companies accountable for their failure to make their supply chains more
transparent. It rather seems like a mere obligation of means is required.
Some companies can thus gain good public standing without having
conducted any significant changes to reduce forced labor in their supply
chains.
The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (California
Transparency Act), a piece of legislation enacted in California in 2012,
probably has provided the inspiration for the drafting of the BSCT.97 The
California Transparency Act was aimed at companies with more than $100
million United States dollars in annual revenue.98 Specifically, the California
law requires companies to disclose on their website their initiatives to
eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their supply chains.99 A
company must notably communicate to what extent it evaluates the risks of
human trafficking and slavery and to what extent it provides employees and
management training on slavery and human trafficking.100 However,
96

Katharine Fischman, Adrift in the Sea: The Impact of the Business Supply Chain
Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2015 on Forced labor in the Thai Fishing
Industry, 24 I ND . J. G LOBAL L EGAL S TUD . 227, 239 (2017).
97
Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.43; See Jonathan Todres, The Private Sector’s Pivotal Role in
Combating Human Trafficking, 3 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 80, 96-98 (2012) (discussing the
potential implications of requiring companies to disclose to what extent they meet
certain requirements).
98
See Section 1714.43 (a) (1) of the Californian Civil Code.
99
See Section 1714.43 (2) (D) (b) of the Californian Civil Code.
100
Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.43. It is estimated that the reporting requirement will impact
about 3,200 companies headquartered in California or doing business in the state. See
VERITÉ, COMPLIANCE IS NOT ENOUGH: BEST PRACTICES IN RESPONDING TO THE
CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS ACT (2011), http://digitalcommons.
ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2772&context=globaldocs [https://perma.cc/
9JCZ-2YMC]. For suggestions on how investors can go beyond mere compliance, see
INTERFAITH CENTRE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, EFFECTIVE SUPPLY CHAIN
ACCOUNTABILITY: INVESTOR GUIDANCE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CALIFORNIA
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compliance here again entirely depends on the willingness of the company
to cooperate because no sanctions are directly provided in case of noncompliance.101
3. Commonwealth Countries
Commonwealth countries have also started introducing reporting duties in
several statutes. The United Kingdom has introduced three pieces of
legislation on corporate human rights reporting. In addition, Australia has
implemented both national and regional bills; however, as explained in this
section, these bills fail to provide sufficient penalties for non-compliance and
reporting requirements are too broadly framed.
Inspired by the California Transparency Act, the United Kingdom has been
a forerunner in the field of corporate human rights reporting. In fact, in
2015, the United Kingdom Parliament passed the Modern Slavery Act,
which requires commercial organizations to report on the measures they
are taking to ensure that slavery and human trafficking is not taking place
in their operations or supply chains.102 This duty to report applies to all
companies with a minimum annual turnover of £36 million, which carry at
least part of their business in the United Kingdom.103 The statement may
include information about the organization’s structure, company’s policies,
due diligence processes, risks, performance indicators, and training relating

TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS ACT AND BEYOND (2011), https://www.iccr.
org/effective-supply-chain-accountability-investor-guidance-implementation-californiatransparency [https://perma.cc/82D3-63YD].
101
For further discussion on the question of tribunals’ involvement over corporate social
responsibility issues in the U.S., see Adeline Michoud, The Exercise by U.S. Courts of
Their Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Corporate Wrongs Claims: Overview and
Perspectives, YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2019) (forthcoming).
102
Modern Slavery Act 2015, c.30, § 54(4) (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2015/30/contents/enacted/data.htm [https://perma.cc/7XD7-XZ77].
103
Id. § 54(2)(b) and (12). Read with Regulations 2 and 3 of the Modern Slavery Act
(Transparency in Supply Chains) Regulations 2015.
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to slavery and human trafficking.104 However, the Modern Slavery Act has
a rather narrow scope that omits many violations of labor rights.
Section 54 (1) of the Modern Slavery Act provides “A commercial
organization within subsection (2) must prepare a slavery and human
trafficking statement for each financial year of the organization.”105
Furthermore, the disclosure obligation in Section 54 is enforceable by the
Secretary of State, who can bring civil proceedings before the High Court to
ask for specific performance of this statutory duty.106 The Modern Slavery
Act

also

created

the position

of

an Independent Anti-slavery

Commissioner whose functions are to encourage good practice in the
prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of slavery and human
trafficking offenses.107
However, there is no penalty for non-compliance with the disclosure
obligation: the Secretary of State can only require an injunction from the High
Court.108 The only sanction that corporations risk is to see their reputation
being affected.109 Professors Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite have
emphasized that to ensure a successful regulation, states should secure a
“synergy between punishment and persuasion.”110
A primary analysis of the first 75 statements published by corporations
following the Modern Slavery Act shows that only 29 percent of them
complied with the act’s basic procedural requirements; that is, the statement
is approved by the Board and signed by a company director (or equivalent)
104

Id. § 54(5).
Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.43 (“Section 54 was inspired by Section 1714.43 of the Civil
Code of the State of California enacted by the California Transparency in Supply Chains
Act of 2010 (ch 556 Cal Stat ß 2641).”).
106
Modern Slavery Act, supra note 98, at §54(11).
107
Id. at §40.
108
Id. at §54(11).
109
Stephen Park, Human Rights Reporting as Self-Interest: The Integrative and Expressive
Dimensions of Corporate Disclosure, in ROBERT BIRD ET AL. (eds.), LAW, BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: BRIDGING THE GAP 53 (Edward Elgar, 2014).
110
IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 25, (Oxford University Press, 1992).
105
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and available on the homepage of the company’s website.111 Moreover, the
study revealed that of the six content areas on which information may be
included (like organizational structure, company policies or due diligence),
only nine statements out of the 75 covered the six suggested areas.112
So far, the Modern Slavery Act has failed to provide adequate remedies to
victims. The Modern Slavery Act does not provide any monitoring
mechanism listing the businesses that are concerned with the reporting
obligations set in the act. The legal requirements set in this piece of legislation
are thus very weak. As summarized by Virginia Mantouvalou, who
conducted an assessment of the efficiency of the Modern Slavery Act for the
first three years of its enactment, “the statements produced are the product of
a mechanical exercise without substantive engagement and detailed
information on concrete steps taken to address the problem.”113
Although the Modern Slavery Act has only recently been enacted and its
effects might be better perceived over the long term, the primary analysis
suggests that reporting requirements that are not sanctioned in case of noncompliance might not be effective in achieving transparency. The Modern
Slavery Act is a piece of legislation whose real impact in practice remains to
be assessed. As the primary analysis suggests, reporting requirements that are
broadly framed and that do not provide any penalty for non-compliance are
not effective mechanisms for achieving effective results.114
111

The analysis was conducted by civil society organizations: CORE Coalition and the
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. Press Release: UK Modern Slavery Act, BUS.
& HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CENTRE, 2016 (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/press-releaseuk-modern-slavery-act-first-75-statements-in
[https://perma.cc/PN3T-G3FF]. For a registry of statements made under the Modern Slavery
Act, see Modern Slavery Registry powered by Business & Human Rights Resource Centre,
BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CENTRE (Nov. 17, 2017, 06:50 PM), https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/uk-modern-slavery-act-registry [https://perma.cc/9YYB-UFJ2].
112
Id.
113
Virginia Mantouvalou, The UK Modern Slavery Act 2015: Three Years on, 81(6) MOD.
LAW REV. 1017, 1045 (2018).
114
For a study on the topic, see Iris Chiu, Unpacking the Reforms in Europe and UK
Relating to Mandatory Disclosure in Corporate Social Responsibility: Instituting a Hybrid
Governance Model to Change Corporate Behaviour?, 14 EUR. COMP. L. J. 193, 193Ä208
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In July 2018, the Home Secretary, at the request of the Prime Minister,
announced a review of the Modern Slavery Act.115 Nine expert advisors were
appointed to report on reform possibilities. 116 In January 2019, three British
Parliamentarians in charge of reviewing the United Kingdom’s Modern
Slavery Act issued an interim report suggesting amendments and
improvements to the law.117 They notably noted the lack of enforceability of
the act, noting the lack of penalties in case of non-compliance.118 They
proposed the introduction of a gradual approach, which could include “initial
warnings, fines (as a percentage of turnover), court summons, and directors’
disqualifications.”119 Based on this interim report and the three others issued
by the other experts, the British government is expected to take steps to
propose a reform of the Modern Slavery Act to the Parliament.
Despite its shortcomings and the necessity to reform its functioning, the
Modern Slavery Act seems to have represented an important source of
inspiration in common-law countries. In 2017, the Hong Kong Legislative
Council members proposed a draft modern slavery bill, explaining that action
needed to be taken to meet global standards in the fight against modern

(2017) ; See also Review of the Modern Slavery Act 2015: Terms of reference, UK Home
Office (Mar. 26, 2019, 02:51 PM), available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/modern-slavery-act-2015-independent-review-terms-ofreference/review-of-the-modern-slavery-act-2015-terms-of-reference
[https://perma.cc/28AK-LCAS].
115
HOME OFFICE, MODERN SLAVERY ACT 2015 REVIEW: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT
(2018).
116
See Review of the Modern Slavery Act 2015: Terms of reference, UK Home Office
(Mar. 26, 2019, 02:51 PM), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
modern-slavery-act-2015-independent-review-terms-of-reference/review-of-the-modernslavery-act-2015-terms-of-reference [https://perma.cc/28AK-LCAS].
117
FRANK FIELD ET AL., INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE MODERN SLAVERY ACT (2015),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/773372/FINAL_Independent_MSA_Review_Interim_Report_2_-_TISC.PDF
[https://perma.cc/3RM6-KX5R].
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Id. at 7, para. 1.4.
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Id. at 17, para. 5b.
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slavery.120 The bill provides that certain companies (whose turnover would
exceed a certain amount to be determined) shall publish annual slavery and
human trafficking statements. This bill would go further than the United
Kingdom Modern Slavery Act as it would allow victims to bring civil claims
against persons who were involved in slavery (whether because this person
committed one of the offenses against the claimant or because the claimant
financially benefited from it).121 The Modern Slavery Bill was discussed at
the Legislative Council on June 5th, 2018,122 but no consensus has been
reached yet.123
Australia also adopted a modern slavery bill in November 2018. 124 As of
January 1, 2019, all companies operating in Australia with an annual revenue
of at least 100 million Australian dollars will be expected to participate in
mandatory reporting on modern slavery risk.125 This reporting duty should
apply to 3000 businesses in Australia.126 Companies will have to issue a

120

See Samantha Woods, Human Trafficking and Slavery: Updates from Hong Kong,
CSRASIA (Aug. 1, 2018), http://www.csr-asia.com/44-csr/newsletter/895-humantrafficking-and-slavery-updates-from-hong-kong [https://perma.cc/QC75-YQDB]; Hong
Kong’s Modern Slavery Bill and Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking – An Update,
Mekong Club (June 23, 2018), https://themekongclub.org/2018/06/23/hong-kong-modernslavery-bill-and-action-plan-an-update/ [https://perma.cc/R9D9-8KYP].
121
See JUSTICE CENTRE HONG KONG, SUBMISSION TO THE PANEL ON SECURITY OF THE
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (2018), https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr1718/english/panels/se/
papers/se20180605cb2-1515-1-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SMW-XHL6].
122
See id.
123
See Antony Crockett, Hong Kong: Modern Slavery Law Proposed at Leigislative
Council, With Requirements for Companies to Publish Statements on Human Trafficking,
BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CENTRE (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/hong-kong-modern-slavery-law-proposed-at-legislative-councilwith-requirements-for-companies-to-publish-statements-on-human-trafficking
[https://perma.cc/G69C-NV7Z]; HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS, MODERN SLAVERY LAW
PROPOSED FOR HONG KONG (2018), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latestthinking/modern-slavery-law-proposed-for-hong-kong [https://perma.cc/8CUZ-AB8G].
124
Modern Slavery Bill 2018 (Austl.), available at https://www.aph.gov.au/
Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6148.
125
Id., Section 5(1)(a).
126
See Sen. Linda Reynolds, Australia: Modern Slavery Bill Passes House of
Representatives, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CENTRE (Sept. 22, 2018), https://www.
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report annually that has been signed by the company director, explaining the
organization of the company and detailing the due diligence policies
undertaken by the company to assess and manage the risk of modern
slavery.127 However, no penalty will be imposed on companies in case of noncompliance.128 The law thus mainly relies on companies’ attachment to their
public image to ensure their compliance. At this stage, the law does not
provide for any possibility for public authorities to impose civil fines on noncompliant companies. The bill only contemplates the possibility of discussing
the inclusion of civil penalties in a review of the bill that should take place
three years after the bill’s entry into force.129
In addition to this national bill, the New South Wales’ Parliament has also
passed a modern slavery bill in June 2018.130 Under this act, companies with
a least one employee working in New South Wales and with a total annual
turnover of at least 50 million Australian dollars will have to publish every
year a modern slavery statement on the internal policies of the company to
assess and manage risks of slavery in their supply chains.131 If companies fail
to comply, they could face up to a 1.1 million Australian dollar fine. 132 The
business-humanrights.org/en/australia-modern-slavery-bill-passes-house-ofrepresentatives [ https://perma.cc/JX9Z-3RAE].
127
See Jacqui Wootton et al., Establishing an Australian Modern Slavery Act and Its
Impact on Australian Business, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/establishing-an-australian-modernslavery-act-and-its-impact-on-australian-business [https://perma.cc/5Q8G-J932].
128
Modern Slavery Bill 2018 (Austl.), Section 25(2)(a) available at https://www.aph.gov
.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6148
[https://perma.cc/5YSY-AKKW].
129
Modern Slavery Bill 2018 sch of amends. made by the Senate 3, para. 24 (Austl.),
available at https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/sched/r6148_
sched_3400899c-2869-4c92-978734675ab9c82b/upload_pdf/Modern%20Slavery%20
Bill%202018.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf [https://perma.cc/T98L-WMLN].
130
Id.
131
Modern Slavery Bill 2018 sch. of amends. made by the Senate 3, para. 24 (Austl.),
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/sched/r6148_sched_3400899c2869-4c92-978734675ab9c82b/upload_pdf/Modern%20Slavery%20Bill%202018.pdf;
fileType=application%2Fpdf [https://perma.cc/B5MP-MR9U].
132
This is equivalent to $10,000 Australian penalty units as defined under Section 22(2) of
the New South Wales Modern Slavery Bill. See Modern Slavery Bill 2018 (NSW) (Austl.),
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bill also established a state-level independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner to
raise public awareness and provide advice to companies133 regarding
compliance with the bill. This regional bill is more ambitious than the
national regulation. Indeed, the fact that sanctions are provided in this bill
should be praised. As noted in the interim report of the British experts in
charge of proposing ideas of reforms to the Modern Slavery Act, the
possibility of penalties will encourage companies to foster their compliance
measures.134
B. Civil Law Countries
Several initiatives have also been adopted in the last years in Europe to
create due diligence duties for companies to foster transparency and reporting
of companies’ social and human rights-related commitments.
1. The Netherlands
In May 2019, the Dutch Senate adopted a bill concerning a due diligence
duty to prevent the delivery of goods and services produced through child
labor.135 The law should enter into force on January 1, 2020.136
https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/bill/files/3488/First%20Print.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/Y2SY-D2K2].
133
See Modern Slavery Update: First Australian Modern Slavery Legislation Passes in
NWS, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS, https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latestthinking/modern-slavery-update-first-australian-modern-slavery-legislation-passes-innsw [https://perma.cc/R38M-52NZ].
134
Field et al., supra note 117.
135
Wet Zorgplicht Kinderarbeid (Child Labour Due Diligence Law). See European Coalition
for Corporate Justice, The Netherlands Takes a Historic Step by Adopting Child Labor Due Diligence
Law (May 14, 2019), http://corporatejustice.org/news/15081-the-netherlands-takes-a-historic-step-byadopting-child-labour-due-diligence-law [https://perma.cc/5AYK-VGZN]. For more information
on the reform, see Frequently Asked Questions About the New Dutch Child Labour Due
Diligence Law MVOPLATFORM, https://www.mvoplatform.nl/en/frequently-askedquestions-about-the-new-dutch-child-labour-due-diligence-law/ [https://perma.cc/9Z483Z9T].
136
Bill Adopted by Dutch Parliament Introducing a Duty of Care to Prevent Child Labour,
STIBBE (May 22, 2017), https://www.stibbe.com/en/news/2017/may/bill-adopted-bydutch-parliament-introducing-a-duty-of-care-to-prevent-child-labour
[https://perma.cc/3FCT-67PG].
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Article 6 of the bill requires companies that deliver goods or services in
the Netherlands to provide “a statement to regulatory authorities declaring
that they have carried out due diligence related to child labor in their full
supply chains.”137 However, the scope of the law is quite unclear, as the
bill does not state how far companies have to report on the situation in
their supply chains. 138
The regulatory authority to receive the due diligence statements has not
been defined yet.139 The Dutch Consumer Market Authority will most likely
assume this role.140 The due diligence declaration would only have to be
issued once, and it would then have long-term validity.141 This system of
one-time declarations can be problematic. Indeed, a company’s situation and
its organization are not static. Therefore, a company can change trade
partners, create new subsidiaries, or contract with new suppliers, depending
on its commercial strategies. Therefore, due diligence is an ongoing process
that should be regularly updated and checked upon. This contemplated
system in the Netherlands is different from the United Kingdom. In fact, the
Modern Slavery Act requires annual statements that have to be published on
the website of the company issuing them.142
Under the bill, the regulatory authorities cannot undertake active
enforcement of its rules. Indeed, they can only take action when a complaint
is presented on the basis of concrete evidence that the company’s products

137

Id.; see Cees Van Dam, Statutory Human Rights Due Diligence Duties in the
Netherlands 4 (2016), https://www.rsm.nl/fileadmin/Images_NEW/Sites/Chair_IBHR/
Publications/Van_Dam_-_Statutory_HRDD_duties_in_NL.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF9FEX3X].
138
For example, the Bill does not indicate whether Dutch companies should also have to
report on the working conditions in the factories of their co-contractors’ suppliers.
139
See Frequently Asked Questions About the New Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence
Law, MVOPLATFORM, https://www.mvoplatform.nl/en/frequently-asked-questions-aboutthe-new-dutch-child-labour-due-diligence-law/ [https://perma.cc/458D-9VVL].
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
See Modern Slavery Act, supra note 98, at §54(7).
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were made by resorting to child labor.143 Under Article 3 of the bill, any
natural or legal person whose interests have been affected by the action or
inaction of the company to comply with its due diligence duty, will be able
to file a complaint.
The right to file a complaint encompassed in the law constitutes an
encouraging sign that could substantially contribute to the enforcement of the
corporate commitment relating to the ban of child labor. The government of
the Netherlands now has to specify a few elements in the form of General
Administrative Orders to ensure that the law will have a significant impact in
practice and will be duly enforced.144
2. France
In March 2017, the French Parliament introduced a first-of-its-kind bill in
Europe,145 requiring French corporations to adopt and enforce a due diligence
plan in order to identify and prevent potential human rights, labor, or
environmental breaches that might be caused by their activities or those of
their suppliers.146 The idea behind this new French law is that companies must
publish annually a due diligence plan that identifies risks inherent to their
activities and those of their subsidiaries and suppliers, and prevent these risks
from materializing.
The reform of French law has taken a long time to emerge, as it is the result
of a four-year-long process that involved considerable efforts from civil
society organizations.147 The due diligence duty of corporations is threefold,
143

MvoPlatform, supra note 131.
See European Coalition for Corporate Justice, supra note 135.
145
Loi 2017-399 du relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises
donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of on the due diligence duties of parent and
subcontracting companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.0.]
[OFFICAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE] (2017).
146
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.][COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 224-102-4 (Fr.).
147
The details provided by the Frenc h Sherpa NGO which has participated in the
promotion of the bill. See Due Diligence Act, SHERPA, https://www.asso-sherpa.org/nosactions/proposition-de-loi-devoir-de-vigilance [https://perma.cc/EP24-WZ42].
144
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as provided in Article L225-102-4 of the French Commercial Code:148 (i)
companies need to elaborate a plan which identifies the risks related to
business activities and provides measures to prevent serious violations of
fundamental rights;149 (ii) the plan then must be published and disclosed; and
(iii) the plan must be enforced and effectively implemented.
Due diligence duties are not imposed on all French companies’ activities.
Indeed, French companies need to have an established commercial
relationship with their subsidiaries or subcontractors to exercise a due
diligence duty.150 An established commercial relationship is defined under
French law as a “stable, significant and regular commercial relationship,”151
taking place with or without a contract, with a certain volume of business, and
under a reasonable expectation that the relationship will last.152 However, the
exact criteria to determine what constitutes an established commercial
relationship remains ill-defined and depends on the appreciation of the
courts.153 In any case, from this definition, it appears that companies will not

148

CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.][COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 225-102-4 (Fr.).
The law lists five of the measures that could be taken by companies : i) a mapping that
identifies, analyses and ranks risks; ii) procedures assessing the situation of certain
subsidiaries, subcontractors or suppliers; iii) actions to prevent and mitigate risks and
serious harms; iv) an alert mechanism; and v) a monitoring scheme to follow-up on the
plan’s implementation and efficiency of measures. See Loi 2017-399 du relative au devoir
de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of on
the due diligence duties of parent and subcontracting companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.0.] [OFFICAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE] (2017).
150
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.][COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 225-102-4 para 1.2. (Fr.).
151
See Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] com., Sept. 15, 2009,
Bull. civ. IV, No. 08-19.200 (Fr.). French law refers to the term of “relation commerciale
établie”.
152
See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.][COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 442-6-I-5 (Fr.); See also
Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Dec. 18, 2007, Bull.
civ. II, No. 06-10390 (Fr.); see also Sandra Cossart et al., The French Law on Duty of Care
: A Historic Step Towards Making Globalisation Work for All, 2 BUS. HUM. RTS. J. 317,
320 (2017).
153 Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] com., Sept. 15, 2009, Bull.
civ. IV, No. 08-19.200 (Fr.) (holding that successive contracts between parties could be
held to characterise an established commercial relation).
149
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need to exercise any due diligence towards the contractors of their
subcontractors, even though they are indirectly part of their supply chain.
If they fail to comply with their due diligence duties, French companies
can be held liable in tort following Articles 1240 and 1241 of the French Civil
Code.154 Therefore, if these companies fail to to implement their corporate
social responsibility plans effectively, they can be condemned by civil courts
to the payment of damages.
As for most other initiatives imposing a duty to report on companies, the
French legislature expects that French companies will take action in order
to protect their reputation and their public image.155 Therefore, following
Article L. 225-102-5 of the Commercial Code, courts can order the
publication, broadcast, or display of their decisions, at the expense of the
company.156 Considering how much companies fear bad publicity, such a
measure could have been generalized as a systematic measure by the legislator
instead of leaving it to the discretion of the judges.157
The French reform represents a major milestone to improve corporate
compliance with human rights. Indeed, France has introduced i n t h i s
w a y a due diligence duty on companies to prepare a vigilance plan to
identify and prevent serious human rights violations committed by their
subsidiaries and their subcontractors. Once the risks posed to human rights
are identified, companies are required to implement and report annually on a

154

See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.][COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L225-102-5
(Fr.).(expressly makes reference to Articles 1240 and 1241 of the French Civil Code, which
are two of the main extra-contractual liability provisions in French law).
155
Suzanne Carval, La Responsabilité Civile Dans sa Fonction de peine Privée 31, (LGDJ,
1995).
156
See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.][COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L225-102-5 para. 4 (Fr.)
(providing in its original French version : « La juridiction peut ordonner la publication, la
diffusion ou l’affichage de sa decision ou d’un extrait de celle-ci, selon les modalités
qu’elle précise. Les frais sont supportés par la personne condamnée.”)
157
Anne Danis-Fâtome & Geneviève Viney, La responsabilité civile dans la loi relative au
devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordres, Recueil
Dalloz 1610, 1618 (2017).
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“vigilance plan” aiming to mitigate risks.158 In case of non-compliance,
interested parties can enforce non-compliance with the law through the
courts.159 This intervention of courts on corporate social responsibility issues
is key to secure compliance by companies.160 French law has thus set a good
example which could be followed by other countries. The enforceability of
the new French reform, as well as its impact in practice, remain to be seen in
the years to come.
3. Switzerland
Switzerland is also considering a reform of its laws to impose a due
diligence duty on its transnational corporations.161 This development
stemmed from a coalition of 85 civil society organizations which launched
the “Responsible Business: Protecting Human Rights and the Environment”
initiative.162 A popular initiative offers Swiss people the possibility to revise

158

See Article L225-102-4 (I) para. 3 of the French Commercial Code, which provides in
its original French version, “Le plan comporte les mesures de vigilance raisonnable propres
à identifier les risques et à prévenir les atteintes graves envers les droits humains et les
libertés fondamentales, la santé et la sécurité des personnes ainsi que l’environnement
(…)”.
159
See Article L225-102-4 (II) of the French Commercial Code, which provides in its
original French version : “Lorsqu’une société mise en demeure de respecter les obligations
prévues au I n’y satisfait pas dans un délai de trois mois à compter de la mise en demeure,
la juridiction compétente peut, à la demande de toute personne justifiant d’un intérêt à agir,
lui enjoindre, le cas échéant sous astreinte, de les respecter.”
160
For a discussion on the importance of the role of the judge to enforce the corporate duty
of vigilance, see Isabelle Desbarats, La RSE « à la française » : où en est-on?, Droit Social,
Dalloz 525, 525 (2018); Pauline Abadie, Le juge et la responsabilité sociale de
l’entreprise, Recueil Dalloz 302 (2018).
161
Official Website of the Initiative Committee. SWISS COALITION FOR CORPORATE
JUSTICE, https://corporatejustice.ch/about-the-initiative/ [https://perma.cc/6XRD-9RKH]
(last visited Mar. 22, 2019, 07:06 PM).
162
Economiesuisse Torpille Un Dialogue Constructif Entre Multinationales Et Ong
(Constructive
Dialogue
Between
Multinations
and
NGOs),
INITIATIVE
MULTINATIONALES RESPONSABLES, https://initiative-multinationales.ch/communiquesde-presse/economiesuisse-torpille-un-dialogue-constructif-entre-multinationales-et-ong/
[https://perma.cc/69EN-74HC] (last visited Mar. 26, 2019, 01:44 PM).
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the Constitution through the voting process.163 If a constitutional initiative is
adopted, the constitutional rule has to be implemented by legislation. 164
The initiative launched by the civil society proposes Swiss people to add
Article 101a to the Swiss Constitution relating to the responsibility of
businesses.165 The proposal states that companies that have their registered
office, their central administration or their principal place of business in
Switzerland must respect internationally recognized human rights and ensure
that these rights are also respected by companies abroad which are under
their control.166 Therefore, the idea, which is similar to French law, is to
require Swiss companies to engage in due diligence and risk assessment and
to develop measures to prevent possible human rights violations and
environmental damage.167 If the initiative is adopted, companies would be
required to carry out due diligence and to report on the measures taken to
ensure compliance with fundamental rights.168 If companies do not comply
with their due diligence obligations, they might face civil liability. 169
Yet, on June 14, 2018, the Conseil National (the lower house of the Swiss
Parliament) adopted a counter-proposal to this initiative.170 The counter163

See CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST][CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, art 138-142
(Switz.).
164
Id.
165
See The Initiative Text with Explanations Factsheet, SWISS COALITION FOR
CORPORATE JUSTICE, https://corporatejustice.ch/wpcontent/uploads//2018/06/KVI_
Factsheet_5_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/KUV7-5JYQ].
166
Id. at 1. See Art. 101a para. 2 of the Initiative.
167
See Nicolas Bueno & Sophie Scheidt, Die Sorgaltspflichten von Unternehmen im
Hinblick auf die Einhaltung von Menschenrechten bei Ausladsaktivitäten, EUR. CTR. FOR
CON. AND HUM. RTS. October 2015; See also Christine Kaufmann,
Konzernverantwortungsinitiative: Grenzenlose Verantwortlichkeit?, COALITION FOR
COALITION FOR SWISS REV. OF BUS. & FIN. MKT. LAW 50, 50Ä51 (2016).
168
See The Initiative, supra note 168. See Art. 101a para. 2 let.b of the Initiative.
169
Id. See Art. 101a para. 2 let..c of the Initiative.
170
See Contre-projet indirect à l’initiative populaire “Entreprises responsables - pour
protéger l’être humain et l’environnement” (Indirect counter-project to the popular
initiative “Responsible enterprises - to protect the human being and the environment),
https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20170498
[https://perma.cc/M48Y-N48R] (last visited Aug. 12, 2018, 04:30 PM).

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Can Soft Words Lead to Strong Deeds?

proposal is less ambitious than the original initiative. Indeed, the counterproposal only aims to target a restricted circle of companies, which, over two
consecutive financial years, would meet two of the three following criteria:
(i) the company has a balance sheet of 40 million Swiss Francs; (ii) the
company has a turnover of 80 million Swiss Francs; and/or (iii) the company
employs in average 500 full-time employees.171 Moreover, even though the
counter-proposal provides that companies shall have a due diligence duty,
their civil liability is limited to offenses involving their subsidiaries and
involving injuries to life, physical integrity, or property.172
The counter-proposal has been discussed at the Conseil des Etats (the
higher-house of the Swiss Parliament).173 In March 2019, the Conseil des
Etats recommended that the initiative should be rejected.174 The Conseil
National now has to decide whether it wants to keep its counter-proposal.
The Committee that has developed the original initiative has already
informed that it will withdraw the initiative (therefore canceling the
referendum) if the counter-proposal is adopted without any modification.175
Otherwise, in the case where the counter-proposal was not adopted and a
referendum came to be organized, the organization of the voting would not
see the light of day before February 2020.176 The Swiss people would then
have to decide on the adoption of the initiative.

III. CONCLUSION
Over the last years, corporations have increasingly made commitments to
protect human rights and social norms, notably to meet consumers’
expectations and concerns regarding corporate social responsibility issues.
171

Id.
Id.
173
Id.
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See Contre-Projet (Against Project), INITIATIVE MULTINATIONALES RESPONSABLES,
https://initiative-multinationales.ch/contre-projet/ [https://perma.cc/48GY-VBFL] (last
visited Mar. 26, 2019, 02:02 PM).
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To show their good faith and their commitment to corporate social
responsibility, many companies have adopted corporate codes of conduct in
which they commit to respect a certain amount of norms in their productions
methods. However, the strength of these soft law agreements is not
established yet, and the question of their applicability towards third-party
beneficiaries—such as employees of the firm’s or consumers wishing to
enforce them—remains unresolved.
To foster compliance with certain social norms, several states have
introduced reporting duties for companies. However, these reporting duties
are quite limited, as they are either applied to a certain industry,177 or they
require reporting on measures concerning a certain type of wrongs only.178
Such a specific focus on certain sectors or violations results in a
fragmentation of human rights.179
The aim of these reporting duties is to bring companies to report and to
bring public awareness to their activities. However, mechanisms to ensure
compliance with the obligations reported have not been set up in parallel,
which gives corporations too much flexibility. This approach might result in
a whitewashing exercise, allowing companies to claim compliance with a
certain number of norms without having to prove compliance or being subject
to sanctions if found to be non-compliant.
Governments should thus adopt legislation to regulate corporate social
responsibility initiatives and establish a proper framework to
supervise them. Moreover, the civil society should exercise pressure on
companies to require change from them and should be given the tools to
enforce corporations’ commitments. Companies’ non-compliance with their
177

For example, the Dodd-Frank Act relates to the mining industry in the Democratic
Republic of Congo.
178
The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 2010 notably requires reporting on
risks of slavery and trafficking in supply chains, the Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence Act
relates to child labor action plans.
179
OLGA MARTIN-ORTEGA, Due Diligence, Reporting and Transparency in Supply Chains
– The United Kingdom Modern Slavery Act, in Angelica Bonfanti (ed.), BUS. & HUM. RTS
IN EUR. 120 (Routledge, 2018).
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codes of conduct represent misrepresentations that should lead to sanctions.
If companies are left to decide the extent of their commitments, such a
laissez-faire approach might result in abuses.
France has set an interesting example in introducing a due diligence duty
for companies that should provide inspiration for other jurisdictions. In fact,
due diligence is an efficient mechanism, as it plays a double role. It can first
play a preventive role to compel corporations to take measures before any
harm arises. Moreover, due diligence can allow victims to obtain reparation
when due diligence requirements have not been respected by companies.
Governments should thus adopt legislations to impose due diligence duties
on companies that are enforceable before national courts and generate
sanctions in case of non-compliance. Such a widespread approach would
contribute to the fulfillment of the United Nations Guiding Principle on
business and human rights.
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